We reconsider the motivation of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), the non-parametric technique that is widely employed for analyzing productive efficiency in academia, the private sector and the public sector. We first argue that the conventional engineering motivation of DEA can be problematic since it often builds on unverifiable production axioms. We then provide a dual viewpoint and highlight the 'behavioral' interpretation of DEA models.
The public sector is increasingly interested in the productive efficiency of its entities. For instance, Coelli et al. (2003) extensively discuss the relevance of efficiency evaluations for regulated sectors. More generally, the growing number of empirical applications suggests that productive efficiency analysis is of key interest for many sectors such as academia, the business community and government institutions; see, e.g., Gattoufi et al. (2004) and Emrouzenjad et al. (2008) for overviews. This observation calls for well-established empirical tools that are specially tailored for testing consistency of observed behavior with (theoretical) optimizing behavior, and for quantifying deviations from optimization (or 'inefficiencies'). Afriat (1972) , Hanoch and Rothschild (1972) , Diewert and Parkan (1983) and Varian (1984) , among others, have advocated a 'behavioral' non-parametric approach to analyzing producer behavior. This approach starts form a behavioral model of optimizing/efficient behavior and allows for testing implications of micro-economic theory directly on the data. That is, one does not need a functional representation of the production technology, and so one can minimize the risk of erroneously rejecting optimizing producer behavior due to an erroneous parametric specification of the (typically unknown) technology. This is particularly convenient, since economic theory does in general not imply a particular functional form and reliable specification tests are not available in many cases.
Non-parametric efficiency analysis is increasingly applied for measuring the degree of 'efficiency' of observed producer behavior, most commonly under the label 'Data Envelopment Analysis' (DEA; after Charnes et al. (1978) ).
1 DEA models are conventionally motivated from 'engineering' information, e.g. pertaining to the prevalent returns-to-scale or the marginal rates of input substitution/output transformation. Still, such engineering information is mostly difficult to verify in practice. In fact, imposing production properties that cannot be justified in a convincing way seems to conflict directly with the very nature of non-parametric analysis, which is often credited for imposing minimal structure on the research setting under investigation. This consideration is particularly relevant for DEA evaluations of the public sector, which are usually characterized by minimal information on the nature of production possibilities.
In this paper, we adopt an 'economic' (as opposed to 'engineering') perspective on DEA:
we start from a clear specification of the production-behavioral models and use minimal (nonverifiable) engineering information. Our insights re-interpret DEA efficiency measures as measures for violations of economically optimizing behavior. To keep our exposition simple, we mainly focus on profit maximizing and cost minimizing behavior. However, as we will indicate, our insights readily extend towards alternative production-behavioral models. By making explicit this economic motivation of DEA, we hope to contribute to its further dissemination and to stimulate public sector applications of DEA that build on its behavioral interpretation.
We note at the outset that our discussion bears some analogy to that in Varian (1990) and Färe and Grosskopf (1995) , where a similar interpretation of DEA efficiency measures is (implicitly) advocated. Unfortunately, although these ideas have some clear advantages, they are only minimally used in the applied DEA literature; see, e.g., Cherchye et al. (2008 Cherchye et al. ( , 2011 Cherchye et al. ( and 2012 for some applications that demonstrate the advantages of the behavioral perspective of DEA. If only for that reason, it seems useful to set out methodological guidelines for economically meaningful applications of DEA. Furthermore, our discussion includes a number of insights that
have not yet been articulated in the literature, and prepares the ground for instituting new DEA models depending on the production-behavioral model that is subject to testing.
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the conventional 'axiomatic' DEA approach for reconstructing production possibilities. Section 3 is concerned with non-parametric economic efficiency analysis, following the perspective of Afriat (1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983) and Varian (1984) . Section 4 bridges the gap between the seemingly distinct viewpoints adopted in Sections 2 and 3, and brings to light the economic meaning of DEA. Section 5, finally, reproduces the main insights and provides some concluding discussion.
2 Reconstructing production possibilities: an axiomatic approach A producer creates outputs from various combinations of inputs (factors of production). To study producer choices we need a convenient way to summarize the production possibilities,
i.e. which inputs and outputs are technologically feasible. The set of all technologically feasible input-output combinations is called the production possibility set.
To formally represent that set, we denote by z = (z 1 , . . . , z q ) ∈ R q a (non-zero) netput vector with z j the value of netput commodity j. Positive components of z represent outputs and negative components represent inputs. Throughout we assume that the vector z captures at least one input and at least one output, and that all producers use the same commodities as inputs and produce the same outputs. The production technology is represented by the (non-empty and closed) production possibility set
If we make the explicit distinction between input and output vectors, we use z = (−x, y) with x ∈ R l + the input vector and y ∈ R m + the output vector (q = l + m). Then, the set T can be decomposed into input requirement sets
which contain all input vectors x that can produce the output vector y.
Production axioms. The true production possibility set T (or the input requirement set L T (·)) is usually not observed. Therefore the DEA-type axiomatic approach typically approximates the unobserved set T by an empirical production set that is constructed from a set of observed producers. We represent each observed producer s by the netput vector z s = (−x s , y s ), with s ∈ S = {1, . . . , |S|}, for S the set of observed producers. To construct the empirical approximation of T , we will consider the production axioms A1-A4. This axiom says that all observed netput vectors are technologically feasible and thus that they should belong to the (unobserved) production set T . This is really an empirical postulate rather than a production postulate. It makes that we exclude empirical phenomena such as measurement error or outlier behavior.
Monotonicity, sometimes also referred to as 'strong (or free) disposability' of inputs and outputs, implies that the producer can always costlessly dispose unwanted inputs and/or outputs.
That is, more inputs cannot lead to producing less outputs and producing less outputs cannot lead to using more inputs. It implies that marginal rates of substitution/transformation (between inputs, between outputs and between inputs and outputs) are nowhere negative or, in other words, there is no congestion.
A3 (convexity in netput space): if z ∈ T and z ∈ T , then λz
Convexity in netput space entails that marginal rates of substitution/transformation (between inputs, between outputs and between inputs and outputs) are nowhere increasing. Convexity in input space, finally, is a weaker version of A3 and entails non-decreasing marginal rates of input substitution.
Apart from these specific production axioms, the (axiomatic) DEA approach typically builds on a 'minimal extrapolation' requirement, which says that the production set approximation should be the minimal set that is consistent with the axioms adopted; see Banker et al. (1984) .
2 In a theoretical framework, Shephard (1970) provides a comprehensive list of production axioms (including ours), which we do not intend to fully review. Other axioms presented in the DEA literature (see, e.g., ) are not considered because they are not instrumental to our following discussion.
3 See, e.g., Grosskopf (1996) for extensions of DEA that weaken this assumption.
Production set approximations. Different production set approximations are obtained from different sets of axioms. First, if we impose axioms A1 and A2, then the resulting production set approximation consistent with the minimum extrapolation principle is the monotone hull of the data: M (S).
Second, if we additionally assume convexity in the netput space (i.e. axiom A3), then we get the convex monotone hull of the data: CM (S).
Finally, replacing axiom A3 by axiom A4 leads to the approximation CIM (S), which corresponds to M (S) with the additional property that input requirement sets are convex.
Increasing stringency of the different assumptions underlying these three production set approximations implies
The sets M (S) , CM (S) and CIM (S) are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 for respectively netput space and input space. Figure 1 represents these production set approximations for a situation with 3 producers that use a single input to produce a single output, i.e. S 1 = {1, 2, 3}
and z s = (−x s , y s ) ∈ R − × R + , with s ∈ S. The monotone hull of the data M (S 1 ) is the area under the full line, while CM (S 1 ) coincides with the area under the dotted line. Observe further that for this particular situation (with only one input and one output) M (S 1 ) = CIM (S 1 ). Figure 2 represents the input requirement sets for a situation with 3 producers that each produce the same output with two inputs, i.e. S 2 = {1, 2, 3} and
As the three producers in S 2 produce exactly the same output y 0 , we get that From these illustrations we can conclude that production axioms directly affect the empirical production set. Hence, an important question pertains to the validity of these axioms. Unfortunately, there does not seem to exist any a priori reason why a production set should necessarily be monotone or convex. In fact, it turns out that monotonicity and convexity assumptions are problematic in many practical settings, and that reliable non-parametric specification tests are currently not available; see Cherchye and Post (2003) for an in-depth discussion. McFadden (1978; pp. 8-9) aptly summarizes that the common rationale for monotonicity and convexity assumptions in production theory lies in their analytical convenience rather than in their economic realism. As such a 'non-engineering' justification of DEA is recommendable, which motivates our 'behavioral' (or 'economic') perspective in the next section.
Economic efficiency analysis: a non-parametric approach
While the axiomatic approach focuses on the specification of production possibilities, we now take the dual perspective: we start from a specification of the production objectives and impose the least structure on the production possibilities. Production objectives vary in different situations.
The most frequently maintained position is that producers pursue profit maximization. In some instances, however, cost minimization for given output might seem a more reasonable assumption.
For instance, when the producer is a price taker in input markets but operates in regulated output markets (as is often the case for public agencies).
In the following, we focus on profit and cost efficiency analysis of producer k (∈ S), i.e. the producer associated with netput choice z k = (−x k , y k ). In the first subsection, we assume that profit efficiency and cost efficiency is evaluated at (non-zero) price vectors
respectively. In the second subsection we deal with the setting in which this price information is not available.
Cost and profit efficiency with price information
The minimum cost that could have been achieved by producer k (i.e. the producer associated with input choice x k ) when producing y k is
We say that producer k acts cost efficient if the observed cost equals the minimum cost (i.e
Similarly, the maximum attainable profit at p k is defined as
Again, profit efficiency (resp. inefficiency) is achieved by producer k when
Inefficient production behavior is often observed in practice and can can have different interpretations; see, e.g., Demsetz (1997) for an extensive discussion. Observed producer inefficiency can be interpreted in at least two ways. First, the producer optimization problem may be illspecified. For example, the producers objective function can be erroneously defined; e.g. the objective function may not be fully linear in netputs (due to imperfect competition). Second, as the specified producer objective is typically that of producer owners, producer inefficiency can also be interpreted as would the producer owners incompletely control the producer managers (i.e. inefficiency due to agency problems). Both explanations instantiate the need for economic efficiency measures, to serve either as indicators of 'economic significance' of specification errors (see Varian, 1990) or as 'performance' indicators (and possible monitoring instruments for producer owners; see Bogetoft (1994) ).
Intuitively, meaningful efficiency measures give us an idea about how 'close' observed behavior is to optimizing behavior. In general, a reasonable measure of 'closeness' tells us how far the producer fails to optimize the postulated objective function. For example, when the production objective is specified as profit maximization, a reasonable measure should capture how much 7 For simplicity we assume that minimum cost (in (7)) and maximum profit (in (8)) is defined wherever needed.
additional profit the producer could have acquired if it had behaved differently.
Cost efficiency measurement. For x k w k > 0, Farrell (1957) suggests as a measure for cost efficiency the ratio of minimal to actual cost, i.e.
It is clear that
As discussed above, the precise specification of T is usually unknown. Therefore, the starting point within the non-parametric approach to analyzing production behavior is that a (non-empty)
subset {(−x s , y s )|s ∈ S} ⊆ T is observed (i.e. axiom A1 in Section 2). In principle, one may conduct a cost efficiency analysis by replacing T by this set. This gives minimal ('necessary') non-parametric tests for economic efficiency and upper bound estimates for the degree of cost
However, in practice additional assumptions about the set L T (·) can be useful. 9 For example, Varian (1984) assumes that less output does not require more input, i.e.
A5 (free output disposability): if (−x, y) ∈ T and y ≤ y, then (−x, y ) ∈ T .
Axiom A5 is a weaker version of the monotonicity axiom A2. We note that our below reasoning is easily extended to accommodate for alternative assumptions regarding output disposability (like those considered in ).
As in the previous section, we can then again obtain an approximation of the production possibility set. Axiom A1 and axiom A5, combined with the minimal extrapolation requirement, leads to
Note that by construction OM (S) is a subset of the set M (S), defined in (3), since the latter 8 This measure is not defined for x k w k = 0. Given that x ∈ R l + for all (−x, y k ) ∈ T and w k ∈ R l + we have x k w k = c T (z k , w k ) = 0 in that case. That is, cost efficiency is attained, and we can assign a cost efficiency value of unity to producer k. To keep the exposition simple we abstract from this case in the following.
9 This enlarges the set of possible comparison partners. Otherwise, cost efficiency analysis, for example, could only compare the cost level of the evaluated producer to that of other observed producers that produce exactly the same output vector, of which the number is usually very small. However, it is worth emphasizing that cost efficiency analysis is possible even when only using axiom A1. An insightful discussion of this point is given by Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut (1999).
assumes monotonicity for the set T .
When axioms A1 and A5 are rightly conjectured, necessary tests for cost efficiency can be performed with respect to OM (S) and an upper bound for the cost efficiency measure in (9) can be derived, i.e. C OM (S) (z k , w k ) ≥ C T (z k , w k ) for some k ∈ S.
Profit efficiency measurement. Nerlove (1965) proposed two types of measures: difference measures and ratio measures. We restrict attention to ratio profit efficiency measures, since these measures have a convenient degree interpretation. 10 In addition, ratio measures are easy to work with under limited price information (see our discussion in Section 3.2).
We need to distinguish two cases. First, for π T (z k , p k ) > 0 we define the degree measure
Second, for π T (z k , p k ) ≤ 0 and z k p k < 0 we define
Note that in the limiting case π T (p k ) = z k p k = 0 profit efficiency occurs. Consequently, we can simply attribute an efficiency value of unity to producer k in that case, i.e.
with a value of unity revealing profit efficiency and a value below unity capturing feasible relative profit increase.
Finally, we again have to approximate T by using the set of observed netput vectors (indexed by S). As discussed above, this could lead to several different approximations (M (S), CIM (S),....).
For the sake of brevity, we will make abstraction of this discussion in the setting of profit efficiency measurement and we will only focus on the setting that starts from the observed set of netput vectors (i.e. we only impose axiom A1.)
Measuring shadow cost and profit inefficiency
Not only the set T but also price vectors are often imperfectly observed, or the prices that are observed may not reflect the true opportunity costs perceived by producers. In that case a shadow price approach can be followed, i.e. basically those prices are selected that are 'most favorable' to the observation under evaluation (see, e.g., Färe, Grosskopf and Nelson (1990) ).
Below we consider the extreme case where the evaluator only knows p k ∈ R q + and w k ∈ R l + , while excluding the zero vector. In words, we assume that prices can take any non-negative value, but they can not all be zero simultaneously. Note that, while we exclude the case where all input and output prices are zero, we still allow for zero (shadow) prices for some input and/or output commodities.
Shadow cost efficiency. Using OM (S) ⊆ T the (incomplete information) counterpart of (9) can be defined as (for some k ∈ S)
To show how one can compute this measure, we have to reformulate it. In this ratio formulation prices can be scaled without affecting the value of C I OM (S) z k , R l + . In fact, shadow prices as obtained within the non-parametric approach typically have a ratio interpretation only. That is, they express the value of one commodity relative to that of other commodities, but they bear no direct interpretation in terms of the absolute value of each commodity, at least not without additional price information. Thus, we can set the 'shadow' cost level of producer k equal to unity without losing the informational content of the corresponding (relative) shadow prices, i.e.
we can use
Further using definitions (7) and (10), we can equivalently reformulate (14) as
{c |x k w = 1 and c ≤ x s w for all s ∈ S for which y s ≥ y k } . (15) This last formulation makes clear that simple linear programming tools suffice to compute
The implicit 'benefit-of-the-doubt' pricing, i.e. the selection of most favorable (shadow) prices, is reflected in the max operator. Obviously, the index C
gives an upper bound for the ratio measure C T (z k , w k ) under incomplete price and incomplete technology information.
Shadow profit efficiency. Similarly, we can use shadow prices to deal with incomplete price information (i.e. p k unknown) to analyze profit efficiency. Then, the analogues of the profit efficiency measures (11) and (12) are respectively
and
These measures can be re-expressed as
{u |z k p = −1 and z s p ≤ −u for all s ∈ S} .
The possibility of zero actual profit and non-zero maximal profit is captured in Π
while the possibility of non-zero actual profit and zero maximal profit is captured in Π
The only remaining problem occurs when producer k is profit efficient only at prices that generate a zero profit level, i.e.
Such cases can be detected using linear programming tools. Clearly, we cannot reject profit efficiency when (20) holds.
Consistent with the idea of benefit of the doubt weighting we propose as a profit efficiency
The index Π 
Cost efficiency
The dual formulation of (15) is (for some k ∈ S)
This can equivalently be reformulated as
Hence, C I OM (S) z k , R l + can be computed as the maximum equiproportionate reduction of inputs within CIM (S). This is precisely the Debreu-Farrell input measure defined with respect to CIM (S). The fact that this reference production set is obtained falls in line with the general result that monotonizing and convexifying input requirement sets does not interfere with the analysis of cost efficiency; see Varian (1984) for more discussion. That is, the minimum cost level remains unaffected and thus
Hence, minimal cost reduction is also given by the maximal equiproportionate input shrinkage factor as computed with respect to CIM (S).
We illustrate our discussion by means of Figure 3 . This continues our example introduced in Let us first consider economic/cost efficiency. Suppose that the relative input prices correspond to the slope of the bold iso-cost line. Under these input prices, the vector x 1 is cost minimizing. Obviously, this conclusion does not change when imposing monotonicity and/or convexity on the input possibilities. The same result applies for measures of cost efficiency.
For example, for the vectors x 4 and x 5 the associated cost efficiency ratios equal 0x 4 /0x 4 and 0x 5 /0x 5 , respectively; monotonicity and convexity assumptions do not alter these results.
Next, turn to the situation of incomplete price information. From (23) , an upper bound approximation for the cost efficiency measure is then provided by the Debreu-Farrell input measure as computed with respect to the convexified and monotonized input requirement set. 
Profit efficiency
For profit efficiency we obtain as dual problem for (18)
This measure captures (the inverse of) the maximum equiproportionate expansion of netputs (or scale augmentation) within CM (S). This is the McFadden gauge function as computed with respect to CM (S).
Similarly, the dual problem of (19) is
This measure captures the maximum equiproportionate netput reduction (or scale reduction)
within CM (S). As such, it can be labeled the 'inverse' McFadden gauge function. Expressions (24) and (26) are consistent with the established fact that imposing monotonicity and convexity on production possibilities does not affect profit efficiency analysis, i.e. Π
12
Note that (24) and (26) reveal alternative directions of measurement to evaluate profit efficiency under incomplete price information. Both directions fit within the general directional distance function framework to evaluate (shadow) profit efficiency discussed in Färe and Grosskopf (1997) and Chambers et al. (1998) . Interestingly, the benefit of the doubt idea (underlying the shadow price approach that is followed) suggests (endogenous) selection of the most favorable direction of measurement.
13
This benefit of the doubt idea also gives the economic intuition behind (24) and (26) . First, for any price vector under which actual (and maximum) profit is positive, the maximum netput scale expansion (within CM (S)) gives the minimum proportional profit expansion (compare with (24)). Similarly, if actual (and maximum) profit is negative, then reducing netput scale to a certain degree (within CM (S)) always reduces the profit loss to the same degree (compare with (26) ). 14 Since we do not know the actual prices, we need to consider both scenarios, and the benefit-of-the-doubt idea suggests selecting the most favorable scenario (see (21) 14 Observe that the benefit of the doubt principle calls for selecting prices that yield actual and maximal profit with the same sign, as this guarantees the profit efficiency measure to be non-negative.
We have reconsidered the economic motivation of DEA by highlighting its behavioral interpretation. Duality relationships can justify the use of certain production postulates in order to draw inference about economic efficiency performance, and so rationalize the use of certain DEA models. This potential use of DEA is all the more attractive since its engineering motivation is often unpersuasive. Importantly, the appropriate DEA model depends on the economic efficiency concept that is under consideration. In fact, this perspective may institute original efficiency evaluation models; see e.g. Cherchye et al. (2008 Cherchye et al. ( , 2011 Cherchye et al. ( and 2012 ) who develop new nonparametric methodology for analyzing multi-output production by adopting a similar behavioral perspective of DEA.
We plead for carefully checking the validity of axioms that can interfere with the test results (e.g. axiom A5 in the context of cost efficiency analysis), and for investigating the sensitivity of the results with respect to these axioms if it is difficult to verify them empirically. In our opinion, such practice falls in line with the non-parametric philosophy, which advocates minimal risk of specification error.
Two further points pertain to our specification of the production-decision problem. First, the economic efficiency tests and measures discussed above implicitly assume that prices do not vary with quantities and that the eventual quantities and prices are perfectly anticipated by producers. The presented economic efficiency measures can be employed to quantify violations of these hypotheses. However, when different assumptions seem more appropriate, then the behavioral model is to be adapted, which in turn can motivate alternative DEA models (e.g. the monotone hull model (see (3) ); compare with Cherchye et al. (2000) and Kuosmanen and Post (2002) ).
Second, for expositional convenience we have restricted attention to producers that seek to minimize cost or maximize profit given the production technology and the input-output prices. In many environments, we need to impose additional restrictions, e.g. due to the non-discretionary nature of exogenously fixed inputs or outputs or because producers face additional cost or revenue constraints (e.g. ). Once more, different specifications of the production-decision problems entail alternative efficiency analysis (DEA) models.
The core idea of this paper is that starting from a careful specification of the productiondecision problem, which depends on the specific application setting, can provide economic motivation of alternative and perhaps even novel DEA models. We believe that it is important to strongly hold on to this economic perspective in practical applications, rather than 'blindly' resorting to standard, so-called 'well-established' models. In our opinion this forms a natural precondition for meaningful DEA applications.
